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Lydia L. Moland
It is perhaps a commonplace to claim that myths describingthe origin of human society are ethically laden. To speculate
about the beginning of human interaction is to speculate about
the nature of humankind. This in turn is to theorize about how
humans can achieve their potential, what temptations are pe-
culiar to them, and what they ought to do to live up to their
particular gifts. Such accounts, although most often used in the
service of religion, are not unique to it. Philosophers as diverse
as Plato, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Nietzsche have made use of the
genre as well. The questions these narratives ask may seem as
frivolous as the answer is unknowable, for instance: did the first
human perceive this first other human he encountered to be a
threat or an ally? Did knowing of other agents like himself give
him hope, promising safety in numbers, or challenge his sense of
well-being? Did man band together easily and naturally with
fellow man, or did strife and coercion immediately predominate?
The purpose of this paper is to consider first-encounter nar-
ratives in the writings of Kant and Hegel. Reflecting on these
two versions brings an important question into focus, namely:
how can ethical theory best preserve the otherness, the unique-
ness, of the other? We presumably want to ensure that humans
treat each other with respect regardless of any individual’s par-
ticular background, preferences, or personality. But we do not
want, in doing this, to relegate those particular qualities to too
incidental a status. If an individual is valued only as abstracted
from her particularities, we are not valuing the actual individual
in question but only her abstract identity as human. How can
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ethics balance the unequivocal respect we believe is due hu-
mans with the otherness, the particularity, of each individual?
To address this question, first Kant’s and then Hegel’s ac-
count of how a subject comes to be a self-determining agent,
and what this agency means to his interaction with other sub-
jects will be examined. Two questions will help pinpoint the
difference between their respective stories. First, is the other
actually necessary to my becoming a moral agent, or am I a
fully formed agent prior to any interaction with the other? Sec-
ond, what kind of first encounter with the other best preserves
both his and my particularity, our individual otherness? We will
see that both philosophers intend their stories to have peda-
gogical value, to instruct their audiences as to the correct attitude
to have toward other subjects. A contemporary articulation of
these questions can be found in Christine Korsgaard’s The
Sources of Normativity, which offers a third alternative. By look-
ing at her treatment of the other and its role in moral theory,
we can better assess which components of these questions con-
tinue to require attention.
I. KANT
We do not usually associate Kant with narratives explaining
the evolution of human rationality. His more widely read works
give the impression that man has always been a fully rational
agent, complete with dignity and respect. Yet in his essay “Specu-
lative Beginning of Human History” (SB / MA), Kant chooses
the form of a narrative to explore the nature of man’s rational
beginnings.1 There he gives an account of man’s development
into a self-determining moral agent, modeled loosely on the Bib-
lical story of the Fall. The stage is set accordingly, in a newly
created world, where plants, animals and the first couple exist
in prelapsarian bliss. Assuming a first couple is necessary to
explain the propagation of the species, Kant claims: but we must
imagine only that one pair, since the existence of multiple
couples would cause immediate war (SB 110 / MA 86).
In the beginning, Kant then writes, man followed his in-
stincts in order to meet his physical needs (SB 111 / MA 88).
But unlike his fellow creatures, who depended exclusively on
this natural ability for survival, man was not limited to instinct.
He had another capacity whose defining characteristic was in
fact that it allowed him to go against instinct. This capacity
was, of course, reason. Reason had at first been dormant, but
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once it began to “stir,” man became aware of his ability to act
both without and against natural urges. Thus man discovered
“the capacity to choose a way of life for himself.” He was not
bound to follow his instincts simply as he experienced them,
but could subject them to a greater end. This gave the subject a
fearsome sense of responsibility and indeed the dreadful knowl-
edge of death: but along with these weighty realizations came
a sense of freedom and self-determination. “And so man became
the equal of all [other] rational beings, no matter what their
rank might be (Gen. 3:22), especially in regard to his claim to
be his own end, his claim also to be valued as such by everyone,
and his claim not to be used merely as a means to any other
ends” (SB 114 / MA 91).
This first human also realized quickly that freedom from in-
clination was something the animals did not have: he concluded
that he was therefore superior to them (SB 114 / MA 88). He
also understood immediately that this superiority licensed him
to appropriate animals to further his chosen goals. Kant reports
that the first man announced to the sheep with unabashed
anthropocentrism: “the pelt that you bear was given to you by
nature not for yourself, but for me” (SB 114 / MA 91). The man
then removed the sheep’s wool and used it for clothing. The
sheep had no value on its own; its only value was in being sub-
sumed into the self-determining agent’s plans. As lacking
self-determination, the sheep could offer no relevant resistance.
Another key realization followed the first man’s declaration
to the sheep. He realized “that he may not speak in this way to
any man but must regard all men as equal recipients of nature’s
gifts” (SB 114 / MA 91). The first human recognized in one
breath his ability to determine his own way of life and his do-
minion over animals: in the next he realized (“however darkly,”
as Kant says) that any other self-determining being must be
accorded the same respect as he was due, must also be self-de-
termining and therefore not to be used as a means to any end.
In “Self-Understanding and Self-Realizing Spirit in Hegelian
Ethical Theory” (SU), Terry Pinkard imagines the subject rea-
soning in this way:
I must be opposed to any and all actions that would impede or
obliterate [my self-determination]. I therefore must lay it down
as a rule that others respect my freedom, which is to say that
I claim a non-negotiable right to my unimpeded freedom. . . .
But since each of us makes exactly the same argument, and
there is no morally relevant difference between us, I must grant
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you the same right. . . . So we can live together peacefully after
all. (78)2
From the initial realization of self-determination, therefore,
follow the more familiar privileges and responsibilities of a
Kantian subject: freedom, knowledge of oneself as the final goal
of nature, dignity, and respect. From the moment he becomes
conscious of his self-determination, the subject is a fully equipped
moral agent, ready to follow the categorical imperative in all its
formulations, including the formulations which command that
he treat other humans with the same dignity that he knows
should be accorded to himself.
It is not immediately obvious, however, why Kant assumes
that the first epiphany (that other non-human objects are in-
tended for his use) should so readily introduce the second (that
he can use no human as a means to his ends). My self-deter-
mining abilities could, one might argue, just as easily lead me
to deny competing claims to self-determination. Another self-
legislator might imagine that he is able to declare to me (as he
does to the sheep) that nature gave me my talents, my resources,
my capacities for him and not for myself. I might also believe
that my status as self-determining actually precludes other self-
determining subjects, since it is not clear that I can remain
self-determining if my interlocutor is determining himself in-
stead of my determining him. Even if he does not imagine that
he is determining me, his freely chosen ends might conflict with
mine and keep me from achieving them. But for Kant’s agent,
recognizing one’s capacity for self-determination should go
hand-in-hand with recognition of the value of all humanity and
respect for it. His initial encounter with the other will result in
the recognition of an equal, respect for the other’s self-determi-
nation, and a resolve to cooperate in order to preserve both
agents’ self-determining capacities.
Pinkard wonders whether this is not making an assumption
about morality which, to use Rawlsian terminology, smuggles
“conceptions of the reasonable into a conception of the ratio-
nal.” If a subject is genuinely self-determining (rational), we
cannot, the argument goes, assume that he will acknowledge
another self-determining subject (be reasonable). At least it does
not seem to follow without further deliberation. Pinkard sug-
gests that Kant assumes more than he should at such a primitive
stage: “To say that this asserted supremacy is not a morally rel-
evant distinction is to assume a conception of morality from the
outset rather than to derive it” (SU 79). How can I know that
FIGHT, FLIGHT, OR RESPECT? 385
my status as self-determining leads me to value the self-deter-
mination of others,  rather than just assuming it? How is
imagining a peaceful resolution here not begging the question
of how mutual respect between self-determining agents begins?
There are two possible Kantian responses to this charge. The
first is to turn to the “Formula of the End in Itself,” the formu-
lation of the categorical imperative which commands us to
respect the humanity in all people, as found in Kant’s Ground-
ing of the Metaphysics of Morals (429).3 Here we can hope to
find an explanation for why it is necessary for me to transfer
my respect for myself to others. The premise of the “Formula of
the End in Itself,” according to one interpretation, is that
“[r]ational nature exists as an end in itself.”4 Rational nature
here is understood as the capacity to set ends, and Kant argues
that our ability to set ends because we value them is what indi-
cates to us that we ourselves are of value. Christine Korsgaard
calls this the “regress on conditions.” The argument is as fol-
lows: I must infer from my own rationality that as a human I
have value: since I know myself to be a creature who sets ends
and values them, I value myself as the being who confers this
value. And knowing that I confer value on my own ends im-
plies, as Korsgaard writes, that “value is grounded in the
rational nature of the being who set this end,” namely in my-
self (Creating the Kingdom of Ends [KOE] 127).5 I can try to
deny the value of my rational nature, but in the very execution
of an action, I am in fact valuing my ability to set ends and
therefore valuing my rationality.
Now, the argument based on the “Formulation of the End in
Itself” continues, I turn to the other, and the “regress on condi-
tions” transfers to him. Korsgaard writes: “If you view yourself
as having a value-conferring status in virtue of your power of
rational choice, you must view anyone who has the power of
rational choice as having, in virtue of that power, a value-con-
ferring status” (KOE 145). In another self-determining subject
I see someone who sets ends and therefore things of value; I
infer from this fact that it is the subject who confers the value
that is of value.
This gives us more information as to what the link between
rationality and value (in myself or in others) consists of. But it
falls short of answering the charge that Kant assumes rather
than derives a moral state of affairs. It may well be true that my
capacity to set ends and value them signals to me that I am of
value. It may also be true that I see others setting and valuing
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ends, and therefore realize that they believe themselves to be of
value. And certainly it would be most reasonable to assume that
if I see another agent claiming the same value-conferring status
and therefore the same value as I claim, I would recognize that
other agent’s value. But the idea that the subject will do what is
most reasonable is precisely what is being disputed. And although
the argument suggests that without valuing my own value-con-
ferring capabilities, I cannot be a human agent, it is more diffi-
cult to imagine how that necessity would extend to my recognition
of other subjects as well.
We must not rush to the conclusion, however, that Kantian
subjects will always act with reasonable peacefulness toward
each other. In fact, struggle and conflict play a substantial role
in Kant’s discussion of the teleology of humanity. We find this
if we turn again to Kant’s anthropological writings. As we saw,
Kant places the first couple alone at the beginning of his “Specu-
lative Beginning” essay in order to avoid conflict. He does
therefore imagine that humans will not cooperate reasonably
from the beginning. More importantly, Kant stresses in his es-
say “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose”
(IUH / IAG), that not only will we not always live at peace with
others, but that, fortunately for us, we are incapable of doing
so.6 Nature has arranged matters such that humans will live in
mutual conflict: she knows that only so will humanity better
itself. She fosters discord by pitting man’s self-determining ca-
pacities against the wills of other humans. Since man knows
that his self-determination is the source of his value, he pre-
cisely does not want others interfering in his decisions. He would
therefore on the one hand prefer to keep to himself: he has “a
great tendency to isolate himself, for he finds in himself the
unsociable characteristic of wanting everything to go according
to his own desires, and he therefore anticipates resistance ev-
erywhere, just as he knows about himself that for his part he
tends to resist others” (IUH 21–2 / IAG 38). On the other hand,
nature made man such that he is also dissatisfied when he is
alone: “Man has an inclination to society, since there he feels
more like a man, that is, he feels the development of his natu-
ral capacities” (IUH 21 / IAG 37). Man’s participation in society
is therefore conflicted from the very beginning.
This internal unease motivates conflict with other men on
two levels. First, man’s unsociability instills in him a “distaste-
ful, competitive vanity,” the “insatiable desire to possess” and,
more ominously, the “desire to rule” (IUH 21 / IAG 38). Albeit
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displeasing, this desire furthers moral and political progress: it
drives man to war against other nations and to coerce the more
savage others he encounters there “to leave the lawless state of
savagery and enter into a federation of peoples” (IUH 24 / IAG
42). Second, man’s unsociability facilitates human progress
through the domestic encounters that constitute society. Within
society, we learn in “Speculative Beginnings,” man wants to be
esteemed by his fellow men and so is driven to compete with
them. Kant claims that competition therefore produces “decency”
[Sittsamkeit], the “propensity to influence others’ respect for us
by assuming good manners (by concealing whatever could arouse
the low opinions of others)” (SB 113 / MA 90).7 This decency
includes proper clothing, manners, and an “incalculable series
of cultural expansions.” An unreasonable, antagonistic response
is necessary to the social development of man. Kant writes, “Man
wills concord; but nature better knows what is good for the spe-
cies: she wills discord” (IUH 21 / IAG 38).
Perhaps these essays address the worry that Kant was smug-
gling in a reasonable response to the other: certainly the
tendencies to war, competition and social manipulation are not
overly cooperative. Yet, if we look again, acquittal is not so easy.
While the first man is still at risk of immediate conflict with
another, namely while in the garden, Kant explicitly provides
him with no other human besides his spouse (with whom, Kant
seems to imagine, there is no conflict). The conflict and compe-
tition occur only after I realize my self-determination is premised
on my resolve to respect the self-determination of other humans.
My acknowledgement of your actions as worth competing against
evidence my belief that you are an agent with a plan, a point of
view. If you were not, I would not be driven to earn your re-
spect, to show my ability to dominate by manipulating your
opinion. Therefore, even when I am at war or in competition
with you, I will not be denying you your full status as a moral
self. For I still understand myself as deserving of respect and,
having recognized you also as human, know that I must trans-
fer that respect to you. I am therefore not struggling to win
your acknowledgement of my agency. I can assume that I have
that simply by showing that I am a rational agent. Kant, we
now see, does not assume that humans’ response to each other
is of constant, reasonable cooperation. And yet, since competi-
t ive relationships are st i l l  based on the subject ’s  init ial
reasonable response, we still have to ask where that reason-
ableness originated.
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Having considered these Kantian details, we are in a better
position to address our initial question, namely whether Kant
believes the other is necessary to my moral agency. We have
seen that I do need the other, because I need to improve myself.
I need the other’s challenge to bring me out of my isolation,
force me to compete and war with him, and so build a better
society. I do not, however, need the other to become an agent in
the first place. I achieve that independently, as the natural con-
clusion of my valuing of myself. The competition comes only
after my realization of my value and my transferring of that
value to you. Even when trying to manipulate you in order to
gain your respect, I do not attempt to deny your value as a
human. The struggle that contributes to the development of
society is premised on recognition of and respect for other hu-
mans: as such, it assumes that I will immediately acknowledge
other humans. The answer to the question of whether the other
is necessary to human agency must therefore be negative.
At this point, we can only begin to answer the second ques-
tion, namely what kind of description of a first encounter with
the other best preserves that other’s otherness. We have seen
that, in Kant’s view, my relationship with the other should be
initially one of respect and recognition of him as another self-
determining subject. Only premised on that respect is a rela-
tionship of mutual challenge and competition possible. We need
then to evaluate whether this kind of encounter does preserve
the otherness of the other, or whether the other’s particularity
is too much marginalized in the name of this respect. Before
making that judgment, however, I would like to offer the con-
trast of Hegel’s description of the subject’s first encounter with
the other. This comparison will further articulate the balance
between universal respect and acknowledgement of the other’s
distinctness that I presented at the beginning of this paper.
II. HEGEL
Hegel begins his narrative, found in the Encyclopedia’s Phi-
losophy of Spirit (PS), with his first subject, much like Kant’s,
newly aware of his capacities for self-determination. Hegel’s sub-
ject has recently gone from being fully determined by his instincts
to realizing that he can mold these instincts through habit (PS
§409–410).8 Also like Kant’s agent, he finds that his self-deter-
mination in turn gives him the capacity to appropriate other
objects for his own benefit: he too makes use of the sheep’s wool.
Hegel calls this stage “desire” (PS §426). The desiring subject
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believes that his appropriation of the sheep’s wool is proof of
his capacity to have a plan and execute it: in short, it is proof of
his ability to be self-determining rather than determined by
instinct. Objects around him, such as animals, confirm this view
by allowing themselves to be used as means to his ends.
Kant’s subject concluded directly from his superiority over
animals that other human subjects must be self-determining
just as he is. Hegel makes a more ambitious claim: he argues
that this stage, at which a subject considers himself self-deter-
mining without yet having recognized the freedom of other
subjects, is unsustainable.  The argument for this is obscure in
a typically Hegelian way, but it is something like the following:
since the subject’s status as self-determining is based on his
appropriation of objects, he actually needs a steady diet, as it
were, of these objects. Every time he negates the otherness of
one object by making it a means to his ends, he has destroyed
the proof of his self-determination, and must therefore search
for another object to dominate. The subject desires and takes,
desires and takes: “the appetite is again generated in the very
act of satisfaction” (PS §428). He needs an other: but, since his
only means of dealing with an other is to negate its otherness,
he loses the other which could meet this need with every new
appropriation.9 It becomes clear that the subject is actually de-
termined by his desires, not vice-versa. He is dependent on the
existence of objects whose otherness he can negate. His self-
determination is unstable, constantly renewed and destroyed
by forces beyond his control. It is therefore incomplete: he is
not self-determining in the way he believed himself to be.
The subject needs an other that can confirm his status as
self-determining without having its otherness negated, some-
thing that can acknowledge his status as self-determining but
still remain other. In such a case, the confirmation of the
subject’s independence would be lasting, not consumed with
every appropriated object. Where, Hegel invites us to ask, does
one find such an object? Animals cannot sustain their other-
ness in the face of the subject’s goals and plans since they have
no self-determined ends (that is, ends formed without or against
inclination) of their own. The only answer, therefore, is another
self-determining subject. Such a subject, being equally inde-
pendent, could choose to recognize our first subject’s status and
so give that status stability. If he recognizes the first subject’s
status by choice, he is retaining his freedom, and not relinquish-
ing his otherness. Hegel therefore considers it established that
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what is necessary for the subject to escape the treadmill of
desire, the cycle of negating the other’s otherness, is another
subject’s voluntary recognition of that first subject’s self-de-
termination. The need for a movement out of desire gives
“self-consciousness the impulse to show itself as a free self,
and to exist as such for the other:—the process of recognition”
(PS §430).10
My focus on this particular stage is meant to address the first
question posed above, namely in what way the other is neces-
sary to my being a moral agent at all. Hegel clearly thinks that
the other is fundamentally necessary: I cannot make the tran-
sition into real self-determining agency without the recognition
of another. Lacking this recognition, I will remain determined
by my need for objects to appropriate. Paradoxically, then, the
quality that allows the two subjects to remain other to each other
is what they have in common: they are completely separated
from each other by virtue of their common capacity for self-de-
termination. Kant’s view focused on the immediate respecting
of the other as human, and discussed that other’s involvement
in my life only under the assumption of this respect. Self-deter-
mination, the capacity which makes Kant’s two subjects similar,
is what makes them realize their commonality, not what em-
phasizes their otherness. They may not always treat others with
the dignity due them, for instance when they attempt to gain
influence by manipulating each other. But the threat is not that
the two subjects will be able to refuse categorically to respect
each other: that, as Kant argues, is not possible without con-
tradiction, just as it is not possible for someone not to respect
his own humanity without contradiction.11 Hegel instead wants
to explain why humans must recognize their fellow subjects in
order to become full human agents at all. They cannot continue
in this mode of domination without the recognition of another
subject. But in order to see more fully what the difference is,
we must turn to the second question and ask what kind of first
encounter Hegel imagines, and whether the other’s otherness
is preserved through this encounter.
When Hegel imagines the first meeting of self-determining
subjects, he does not characterize it as fundamentally peace-
ful, as did Kant. Although Hegel’s philosophical audience is
meant to know that this other subject is exactly what the first
subject needs, the first subject does not yet know this, and so
his response is not  of cooperation and recognition. Instead,
when he encounters another self-determining agent, he is
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shocked, unsettled, threatened, sees his essence marginalized,
and prepares to fight to win it back. There is not room in the
universe, he believes, for two self-determining subjects. Pinkard
imagines the ultimatum (it cannot be a conversation) thus: “You
claim to be absolute, but there cannot be two absolutes in the
world. . . . Your thoughts, your consciousness, your values are
to be determined by me. Admit it, acknowledge it. Recognize me
as the only autonomous agent in the world for whom there is no
price but dignity” (SU 78). The other of course holds the oppos-
ing view, considers himself to be the only autonomous agent in
the world. There is no immediate respect, only an existential
fight-or-flight reaction. Both demand that they be acknowl-
edged by the other as absolute, and when both refuse, they fight
their “struggle to the death.” The fight ends when one acknowl-
edges the self-determination, or mastery, of the other and
himself as determined by, or the slave of, that other. In effect,
the slave shows himself unwilling to carry the struggle through
to the death; instead, he flees death by capitulating to the other
who then spares his life and becomes his master.
Hegel’s account descends to a violent, barbaric level. Initially,
the outcome of the struggle is bleak. The slave suffers the ulti-
mate humiliation of abandoning his self-determination, making
the master’s desires his own. He does not have the master’s rec-
ognition, as the master has no reason to acknowledge the slave.
What follows this violent confrontation, however, is a slow de-
velopment toward mutual recognition. The slave “works off his
individualist independence in the service of the master, and tran-
scends the inner immediateness of desire” (PS §435). He is forced
to take the master’s perspective and self-determination into ac-
count, and so loses his earlier, fallacious viewpoint that depicted
the world as only there to be appropriated by him. Being forced
to abandon this faulty self-understanding in turn frees him from
the cycle of hopeless appropriations Hegel called “desire.”
Hegel entertains two possible outcomes for the master: in
the Phenomenology, he does not overcome the problem of de-
sire.12 He has made the other subject into a slave, someone
whose recognition of him is coerced. He treats the slave as an-
other means to his ends, just as he did animals. He therefore
cannot shed the fallacious view of himself as the only self-
determining subject. Consequently, he remains in the cycles
of desire. In the Encyclopedia, by contrast, the master even-
tually overcomes his limited world view by coming to value the
slave and so beginning to share a point of view with him.13
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The master no longer desires to destroy the slave, but is con-
cerned for his preservation:
This status [of master and slave], in the first place, implies
common wants and common concern for their satisfaction—for
the means of mastery, the slave, must likewise be kept in life.
In place of the rude destruction of the immediate object there
ensues acquisition, preservation, and formation of it, as the
instrumentality in which the two extremes of independence and
non-independence are welded together (PS §434).14
In the latter case, each subject is slowly brought to recognize
the other as another self-determining subject: in this recogni-
tion comes the promised freedom from the cycle of desire. The
subject is not free in the way he expected to be: he is not free
independently of other subjects around him or by dominating
them. He is free through the other subject. Hegel himself calls
this universal self-consciousness, or “the affirmative knowing
of one’s self in the other self” (PS §436).
Fuller self-determination therefore involves a community,
initially of two and, later, a full society. Independence is, para-
doxically, dependent on another’s voluntary dependence, and
only a specifically self-determining yet self-negating subject will
provide the necessary recognition. The recognition of each other
developed through this interdependence is the basis of the vari-
ous forms of  community that  fo l low:  i t  “ is  the form of
consciousness which lies at the root of all true mental or spiri-
tual life—in family, fatherland, state, and of all virtues, love,
friendship, valour, honour, fame” (PS §426).
The question at hand is not who more accurately narrates
the emergence of the subject and the first encounter with the
other. Neither Kant nor Hegel claims to be recording history.
Kant explicitly discusses how the encounter should be told in
order best to educate the human race and keep us content with
the progress of humanity.15 Hegel, some have argued, also has
pedagogical aspirations. He wants his audience to learn, from
the various stages of consciousness, what the misconceptions
and limitations of self-understanding are.16 Examining the peda-
gogical intent and consequences of these narratives allows us
to compare what Kant and Hegel respectively want their read-
ers to learn about the role other human agents have in moral
theory. What attitude toward a moral other do the two narra-
tives encourage?
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I will briefly sketch what Hegel’s intended conclusions are
first. Hegel’s theoretical point against Kant would be this: it is
true that we think of humans as fundamentally self-determin-
ing,  as  having plans under which they organize their
inclinations and in the service of which they appropriate other
objects. But Kant’s subject involves the other too late, too pe-
ripherally: the subject is too complete from the outset, before
the appearance of the other. From the moment Kant’s subject
realizes his self-determination, his attitude toward the other is
fully formed. He has respect for his own and others’ dignity,
without yet having encountered another subject. For Hegel, a
second subject is not something that is inserted into an already
moral agent’s perspective. The first subject needs the second
subject in order to become an agent at all, in order to get be-
yond the treadmill of desire and to gain the recognition necessary
to sustain his self-determination. This difference has repercus-
sions for how well we are able to protect the other’s distinctness
in ethical theory. If we assume that the moral subject is com-
plete without other subjects, it may be impossible to add the
other, as it were, in an adequate way. The role of relationships,
family and society, may be thereby undermined in the name of
the individual. From this follow all the familiar arguments
against an individualist ethics.
Secondly, it is important to ask what difference it makes to
an ethical model whether we assume that the original encoun-
ter is a Hegelian response of fight or flight, or a Kantian model
of immediate respect. To return to the question posed earlier,
under which model is the other’s otherness better preserved?
Clearly, the question is ethically significant: it matters how we
describe this first encounter because it matters whether we con-
ceive of the other as fully other or rather as something basically
identical to ourselves. On the one hand, Kant’s subject does
preserve the otherness of the other by respecting it as such. He
accepts his interlocutor’s self-determination and therefore his
otherness as a consequence of his ability to set ends for himself.
But does such an account really describe the other as other? Is
the other left any real distinctness, any real difference, or is
that difference precisely what is negated in the automatic re-
spect the other is allowed? Hegel, on the other hand, depicts
the other as completely other: as a threat, a foreign intruder.
This portrayal has the virtue of better emphasizing the distinct-
ness of the other. It forces the subject to confront the other
subject as opposed to it, rather than meet it immediately on
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equal and abstract terms. The struggle that takes place between
the initial encounter and the mutual recognition that comes much
later is evidence that the other’s otherness is something to be
reckoned with.
We might, however, reply that what is important to an ethi-
cal theory is not that the other’s otherness be preserved but
that respect for the self-determining subject be protected at all
costs. A Kantian response to the first question (whether the other
should be included in the formation of the self) might be that it
is true that the other plays no role in the development of a
Kantian subject’s agency, but that this is in fact the safest
theory. For if a subject requires another subject to make him
capable of being a complete human agent, this undermines the
first subject’s autonomy. An agent should not be dependent on
the recognition of others: he is a full subject in and of himself.
Only so is his status as free guaranteed.
A Kantian could also admit that the other’s distinctness is
not fully acknowledged in Kant’s narrative, but claim that this,
again, is actually for the better. Hegel seems to muddy Kant’s
clear, uncompromising command to respect the other. Kant’s
universal and immediate recognition of all self-legislators may
be the safer way to protect the rights of all humans. If these
are pedagogical, pragmatic stories about how we should see our
relations with others, perhaps Kant believes that we are better
off telling a story that portrays respect for the other as immedi-
ate and uncomplicated.
III. KORSGAARD
Christine Korsgaard’s The Sources of Normativity (SN) suggests
a third alternative, combining immediate respect for other hu-
mans with a central role for the other in our agency. Korsgaard
understands the categorical imperative as being “the law of act-
ing only on maxims you can will to be laws” (SN 98), and affirms
that Kant was right to claim that we must follow such an im-
perative. She then proposes to supplement Kant’s theory: in
addition to following the categorical imperative, moral agents
need something she calls practical identity.17 Such an identity
includes particular facts about me: my race, gender, religion,
and so forth. It therefore includes obligations to others, other
members in the communities I have committed to. This identity
in turn will determine what actions are obligatory for me. My
identity as a parent will obligate me to care for my children; my
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identity as a psychologist will require me to listen carefully to
my patients, and so forth. “Autonomy is commanding yourself
to do what you think it would be a good idea to do, but that in
turn depends on who you think you are” (SN 107). If there are
no others in a subject’s life, he has no practical identity. If he
has no practical identity, he is not a full moral agent.
This argument combines the perspectives of Kant and Hegel
in a promising way. On the one hand, Korsgaard shares Kant’s
uncomplicated respect for the other’s humanity. On the other
hand, the existence of the other is clearly necessary for her con-
cept of agency. Korsgaard’s answer to my first question, whether
others are necessary to full agency, appears to be yes. It re-
mains to ask the second question: what story of our encounter
with the other might we choose to preserve the otherness of
both parties? Do we recognize instantly the worth of the other
qua human, or do we struggle with his otherness, thus acknowl-
edging the foreignness of another’s self-determination?
Korsgaard gives a response to this question while attacking
the worry that “valuing your own humanity does not commit
you to valuing that of others” (SN 131). My valuing my own
humanity, Korsgaard had just argued, is at the core of all my
commitments. Also, as we saw earlier, Korsgaard follows Kant
in believing that my valuing of myself because I value my ends
translates into my valuing of others who similarly value their
ends. But why, Korsgaard’s interlocutor asks, would it not be
possible under the above description for me to acknowledge only
my personal interests? How do I ensure that I will act on my
knowledge of the value of others, that I will be reasonable?
Korsgaard argues that it would be much harder to find an
explanation if we had no effect on each other.18 We ought to
devote more attention, she thinks, to discussing how hard it is
not to take the call of other humans into consideration. Korsgaard
imagines a scenario in which you are tormenting me and I call
upon you to stop. She then imagines you admitting that if some-
one were doing what you are doing to me to you, that would be
wrong. But since you are not me, there is nothing wrong. Then
she suggests that this would never really happen: “But the ar-
gument never really fails in that way. . . . it is impossible to
hear the words of a language you know as mere noise. In hear-
ing your words as words, I acknowledge that you are someone”
(SN 143).
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Since you are a human, I cannot help but recognize you. As
in Kant, my automatic recognition of you does not mean that I
invariably treat you well: I can manipulate you, for instance,
to make you respect me. My reaction to you can be negative,
and I can even ignore you. But in manipulating you I will still
be treating you as a human and a source of obligation to me.
Korsgaard imagines another scenario:
“If I call out your name, I make you stop in your tracks. (If you
love me, I make you come running.) Now you cannot proceed
as you did before. . . . But why should you have to rebel against
me? It is because I am a law to you. By calling your name, I
have obligated you. I have given you a reason to stop” (SN 140).
The fact that I am unable to go on in the same way as before
after encountering another human gives evidence for the fact,
so Korsgaard seems to think, that I cannot help but recognize
your humanity. In other words, we should stop worrying about
how to ensure that each of us treats others as humans, since we
cannot help feeling obligated to them as humans. Like Kant,
Korsgaard sees the recognition of the other as clear, exception-
less, and immediate.
If it is true, as Korsgaard suggests, that my recognition of
other subjects is based on the fact that I cannot ignore their
humanity, this suggestion does not allow the other to retain
her full otherness. Some advantage was gained through her
combining of unquestioned value of humanity with the inclu-
sion of others in my practical identity. But this advantage is
undermined if I assume that I cannot but recognize the other.
Respecting another human being purely because of her value
as a human is not fully engaging the otherness of the other. It
is only an automatic response to that subject’s general status as
a human like me. Another subject’s abstract human value does
not capture that person’s genuine otherness.
Korsgaard is right to say that Kant’s moral agent needs to be
supplemented by a more integral need for the other. In this
respect, she, with Hegel, answers the initial question posed in
the affirmative. But the kind of encounter she describes neglects
the importance of showing the other in its full otherness. In
doing so, it duplicates the weakness of Kant’s narrative.
IV. OUTLINE OF A HEGELIAN SOLUTION
It promises to be very difficult to construct a Kantian-based
theory that will leave the other satisfactory distinctness. Given
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that Hegel does seem to be able to retain this distinctness, it
remains to ask whether he can satisfactorily account for spe-
cific ethical relationships, and the answer to this question—in
brief—is that he can. Hegel is determined throughout his sys-
tem to portray the negative element of his dialectic as tran-
scended (aufgehoben) in the synthesis, that is, both preserved
and overcome in the synthesis that follows. In order for the dia-
lectic to function, the antithesis must be seen as fully, completely
other. Indeed, the second subject who confronts the first in
Hegel’s imagined conflict has, as yet, no specific characteris-
tics. He is nameless, faceless, without particular commitments
or projects. He is, simply, other. It is this featureless otherness
with which the first subject struggles.
We remember, however, that what Hegel suggested was ac-
tually necessary for the subject, although the subject could not
yet see this, was a voluntary exchange of recognized self-deter-
mination between the two subjects. This cannot happen at the
stage of master and slave, but in later passages, Hegel shows
how it is increasingly possible in more developed relationships.
In marriage, for instance, I retain my distinctness by offering
it up voluntarily; I gain self-determination by joining willingly
with another. Hegel writes that the first moment of love is the
negating of one’s independence, but he goes on:
The second moment is that I maintain and preserve myself in
this negation, because I gain myself in another person. In her
I have the intuition, the consciousness, that I count for some-
thing, in her I have worth and validity. But it is not only I who
counts, she also counts for me. This means that each person
has in the other the consciousness of the other and of the self,
this unity (VPR4 420).19
This is the account of recognition as it is appropriate in mar-
riage: further descriptions of how we must recognize the other
while maintaining our self-determination are presented by each
stage of the Philosophy of Right . Abstract right demands the
universal respect of persons; morality illustrates the vital but
inadequate nature of subjective certainty. In civil society, the
subject finds individual satisfaction that eventually requires
fulfillment in the greater community of the state, where citizens
are recognized as persons, along with their particular projects.
Hegel does not claim that any given subject begins life by
confronting a faceless other and only after years of develop-
ment joins a community. Rather, through treating each of these
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stages in isolation, Hegel allows us to examine the exact nature
of, among other things, the commitment in marriage, our pro-
fessional obligations, or our role within a society. He does this
in part to emphasize what features a full sense of agency must
include.20 Hegel’s depiction of the original struggle for recogni-
tion is to make the point that one of the necessary components
in ethical agency is acknowledgement of the other’s full for-
eignness. This foreignness should ultimately be mediated by my
recognition of the other’s particular commitments and roles. But
it should never be explained away by shared rationality. The
story of the fight to the death should keep this fact before us.
An ethical theory maintains an important balance when it
guarantees respect and recognition to all humans, requires that
we acknowledge the particularity of other subjects, and also
motivates us to preserve the other’s distinctness. Achieving this
balance is not a new challenge to ethics. Once the dilemma is
brought into focus through a consideration of narratives of first
encounters, Hegel’s success in achieving it through his story of
struggle and recognition becomes apparent. As obscure as nar-
ratives of society’s origins may seem, their pedagogical force
informs our stance toward the other. The effects of these assump-
tions will necessarily be evident in the accompanying ethical
theory: a good reason to examine our narratives carefully.
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